St. John's Law Review
Volume 6, May 1932, Number 2

Article 24

Pleading and Practice Appeal and Error--Civil Practice Act Section
211-a Gives No Right of Appeal as Aggrieved Party to Defendant
Upon Reversal of Judgment Against Co-Defendant (Ward v.
Iriquois Gas Corp., 258 N.Y. 124 (1932))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the owner of a cause of action on contract against the assignor. Such
a result is too harsh; it would impress too great a clog upon the free
alienation of land. **

*"

10

C.V.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE APPEAL AND ERRoR-CIVIL PRACTICE
RIGHT OF APPEAL AS AGGRIEVED
PARTY TO DEFENDANT UPON REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT AGAINST Co-

ACT SECTION 211-A GIVES No

DEFENDANT.-An iron cover hurled into the air by an explosion in

a manhole struck plaintiff. A gas corporation and street railway
company were sued jointly to recover for the injuries sustained.
Plaintiff recovered against both defendants on the trial. The Appellate Division ' reversed the judgment as to the street railway company. Gas corporation appealed from this reversal on the ground
that it deprived appellant of its right to contribution from its codefendant. Held, appeal dismissed and judgment affirmed. 2 Ward
v. Iriquois Gas Corp., 258 N. Y. 124, 179 N. E. 317 (1932).
The Court of Appeals has indicated again 3 that the significance
attached to the comparatively new 4 addition to the Civil Practice
Act, Section 211-a, 5 was greatly over-estimated and the confusion
"Instant case at 5, 179 N. E. at 33.

'233 App. Div. 127, 251 N. Y. Supp. 300 (4th Dept. 1931). Crouch, J.,
dissented from the holding of the Appellate Division on the ground that the
evidence did not warrant a dismissal of the judgment agains tthe street railway
company. The question of the construction of §211-a and the right of the
gas corporation to have its co-defendant remain in the action was not before
that court.
2 Gas corporation, as a second point, appealed from the decision of the
Appellate Division affirming the judgment as to it. Lehman, 1., dissented
from so much of the ruling of the Court of Appeals as affirmed the judgment
against the gas corporation.
'Price v. Ryan, 255 N. Y. 16, 173 N. E. 907 (1930) held that a defendant
cannot complain because a jury failed to find co-defendant negligent; Fox v.
Western New York Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289 (1931)
decided that a co-tort-feasor cannot be brought in under §193, subd. 2, in order
to give effect to §211-a of the CIVIL PRAcTicE. AcT.
'N. Y. L. 1928 c. 714.
"Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or
more defendants in an action for a personal injury or for property damage, and
such judgment has been paid in part or in full by one or more of such defendants, each defendant who has paid more than his own pro rata share shall be
entitled to contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess so
paid over and above the pro rata share of the defendant or defendants making
such payment; provided, however, that no defendant shall be compelled to pay
to any other such defendant an amount greater than his pro rata share of the
entire judgment. Such recovery may be had in a separate action; or where the
parties have appeared in the original action, a judgment may be entered by one
such defendant against the other by motion on notice."

RECENT DECISIONS
unwarranted. Unsuccessful litigants have urged it as new grounds
for appeal and defendants have invoked it to bring in new parties
to share their burden of liability.6 It has been sought to extend the
application of the law to add defendants and now to prevent their
release although there is no evidence to warrant a judgment against
them. The error lay in attempting to create a situation to fit the law
instead of applying it only when all the conditions are present. It
is essential that "a judgment recovered jointly against two or more
defendants * * * has been paid by one or more defendants." The
plaintiff's case must be closed and his judgment collected. Contribution between joint tort-feasors is a gift of the legislature by
statute and this statute derogatory of the common law 7 must be
strictly construed and strictly complied with before the right comes
into existence. This decision properly construes the statute by giving
it a limited application, and again states the opinion of the court that
it does not affect any other section relating to the parties to actions.
J. M. C.
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Plaintiff sued defendants for the purchase price of a motorboat on
defendants' misrepresentation as to its speed. On the trial plaintiff
learned of its error in not suing defendants as agents for breach of
authority of warranty and asked leave to amend its complaint to
include this cause of action. Both alleged causes of action arose in
1919 and the trial was held in 1930. Held, The trial court had discretion in permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint, but the
amendment, constituting a new cause of action, was subject to the
bar of the statutory period and defendants had the right to interpose that defense. Harrissv. Tans, 258 N. Y. 229, 179 N. E. 476
(1932).
An action lies against an agent for misrepresentation of authority to warrant concerning his principal's goods.' If the agency is
'For an exhaustive study of this section and the cases relating to it see
Rothschild, ContributionBetween Tort-Feasors (1931) 6 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1.
"1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

(1924) §345.

' Moore v. Maddock, 251 N. Y. 420, 167 N. E. 572 (1929) ; 1 WILLISrToN,
CONTRACTS (1920) §282: "* * * if on a fair construction of the contract it
appears that the intent was to bind the principal only, according to the better
view the agent is liable, not on the contract, but on an implied warranty of his
authority based on his representation of authority"; TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d
ed. 1924) §130. As to liability on a negotiable instrument when unauthorized
see New Georgia National Bank v. Lippman, 249 N. Y. 307, 164 N. E. 108
(1928) interpreting §39 of the N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW to mean
that the agent is liable as a principal on the note.

